Capital structure and performance in Latin American companies by Juan Gallegos Mardones & Gonzalo Ruiz Cuneo
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Capital structure and performance in Latin
American companies
Juan Gallegos Mardones & Gonzalo Ruiz Cuneo
To cite this article: Juan Gallegos Mardones & Gonzalo Ruiz Cuneo (2020) Capital structure and
performance in Latin American companies, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 33:1,
2171-2188, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1697720
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1697720
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 10 Dec 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 3056
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 3 View citing articles 
Capital structure and performance in Latin
American companies
Juan Gallegos Mardonesa and Gonzalo Ruiz Cuneob
aDepartment Audit and Information Systems, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Universidad Catolica de la Santısima Concepcion, Concepcion, Chile; bFaculty of Engineering,
Universidad de Concepcion, Concepcion, Chile
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explain the financial performance
of companies in Latin America through the lens of capital struc-
ture and ownership structure. We perform a quantitative analysis
of companies in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru using a panel data
method. To avoid endogeneity problems, instrumental variables,
generalised method of moments models, and panels with random
effects are employed. The data cover the period 2000 to 2015.
We find a positive relationship between financial performance,
growth, and size of the company. However, there are mixed
results for short- and long-term financial leverage, as well as for
company liquidity. With respect to the ownership structure of
Chilean companies, a positive effect is observed for the first major
shareholder with financial performance. In general, our results are
in line with those of previous studies. However, the existence of
mixed results between companies and countries makes for an
interesting and novel conclusion.
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Company performance is a key issue for investors, shareholders, and the economy in
general. In addition, performance is a mechanism for control, allocation of resources,
and assessment of the financial health of a company over a period of time (Rumelt,
1991). According to Iswatia and Anshoria (2007), a company’s performance is a func-
tion of the organisation’s ability to obtain and manage its resources in order to
develop a competitive advantage (Omondi & Muturi, 2013). Previous studies have
used return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q as measures of
competitive advantage (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2008).
The factors determine a company’s performance, including corporate governance,
financial leverage, liquidity, and company size, as well as industry-related factors,
such as growth and industry concentration (Cohn, Mills, & Towery, 2014; Liargovas
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& Skandalis, 2008). Other theories complement previous studies that use entrepre-
neurship management and innovation as drivers of company profitability (Audretsch,
Castrogiovanni, Ribeiro, & Roig, 2005; Palacios-Marques, Roig-Dobon, & Comeig,
2017; Rico & Cabrer-Borras, 2018). Kyvik (2018) incorporates the business model,
creativity, and management and financial control as key variables in his analysis.
Unlike previous studies, the objective of the present work is to reveal the relation-
ships in Latin American economics between financial performance and the following
financial variables: leverage, operational risk, size, liquidity, growth, tangibility and
ownership structure. The evidence shows inconclusive results for these types of
economies (Hawawini, Subramanian, & Verdin, 2004). In this investigation, we use
the following three measures of financial performance: ROA, ROE and Q of Tobin.
Our work helps to reveal the variables that affect the performance of companies in
Latin American countries. Using a panel data analysis, our research provides relevant
information about these variables and their specific effects by country.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a summary
of the literature focused on methods employed and main findings. Thereafter, the
database and methodological framework, and details of the variables are discussed.
Then, the results are presented and discussed. The final section summarises and
presents future research challenges.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that in a perfect and complete market in which
there are no personal and corporate taxes, the structure of capital (i.e., distribution of
a company’s debt and equity) is irrelevant to the value of the company. However, in
a later study, in the context of imperfect markets, Modigliani and Miller (1963) find
that financial leverage can allow a company to increase its value by benefiting from
fiscal shield through using debt. In addition, the authors propose the existence of a
positive relationship between performance and leverage. Later, Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973), through a marginal analysis for use of debt, propose the exist-
ence of an optimal leverage and recognise a non-linear relationship between leverage
and performance. This is because when the firm finds this optimal leverage, it maxi-
mises its value and has no incentives to increase its leverage, as this implies decreas-
ing its value (Vargas, 2014). Then, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)
propose the pecking order theory based on asymmetrical information between man-
agers and new investors increasing adverse selection costs (Frank & Goyal, 2009). In
this theory, it is assumed there is no optimal leverage and firms choose financing fol-
lowing a preference order: internal finance, debt, and equity. Myers and Majluf
(1984) argue that there is information asymmetry between managers and investors,
because managers have more information than new investors and act in favour of old
shareholders. Jensen (1986) and Hart and Moore (1994) regard this conflict as an
agency problem that can be controlled with an adequate capital structure allowing
adequate control and minimising agency costs. Jensen (1986) proposes that in compa-
nies with high levels of debt, managers are motivated to invest in profitable projects
to generate cash flow to pay interest and capital, reducing the conflict between
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shareholders and administrators, but the conflict between shareholders and bondhold-
ers increases, because it can lead shareholders to invest sub optimally (Harris &
Raviv, 1988). A significant association is also observed between cash flow and com-
pany performance (Park & Jang, 2013).
Abor (2005) finds a positive relationship between leverage and financial per-
formance and an inverse relationship for companies listed in Ghana. Gill, Biger,
and Mathur (2011) find a positive relationship when they use ROE as a measure
of profitability and a negative relationship when they use ROA. The same results
are found by Olorunfemi and David (2010) when they relate earnings per share
and dividend per share with leverage for Nigerian oil companies. Nawaz, Ali, and
Naseem (2011) obtain the same result for textile companies in Pakistan. Zeitun
and Tian (2007) find a negative relationship between financial performance and
leverage and a positive relationship using Tobin’s Q for companies from Jordan.
Mohamad and Abdullah (2012) show a negative relationship for Malaysian compa-
nies between 2002 and 2010 while Seetanah, Seetah, Appadu, and Padachi (2014)
show a negative and significant relationship between leverage ratio and firm per-
formance measures, like ROA and ROE, for a group of firms in emerging coun-
tries, supporting hierarchical order theory. However, growth opportunities, free
cash flow, oil price, and firm age have insignificant influence. Therefore, we pro-
pose the following relationships.
Hypothesis 1a. There is a positive relationship between leverage and company
performance.
Hypothesis 1b. There is a negative relationship between leverage and company
performance.
Hypothesis 2a. There is a non-linear relationship between debt and company
performance.
Hypothesis 2b. There is a linear relationship between debt and company performance.
In addition, the authors highlight company growth and size as key variables in
company performance (Chiang, Chan, & Hui, 2002). The results are inconclusive
regarding the relationship between growth and profitability, since companies with
growth capacity can generate greater market share and synergy effects, leading to
favourable returns (Abor, 2005; Danis, Rettl, & Whited, 2014; Kester, 1986; Nawaz
et al., 2011; Reilly & Brown, 2006). Rapid company growth can lead to greater com-
petition and economic fluctuations (Idol, 1978; Logue & Merville, 1972). In addition,
higher growth can negatively affect the owner’s wealth (Ba~nos-Caballero, Garcıa-
Teruel, & Martınez-Solano, 2014; Goddard, Tavakoli, & Wilson, 2005; Simerly & Li,
2000). Therefore, we propose the following relationships.
Hypothesis 3a. There is a positive relationship between growth and company
performance.
Hypothesis 3b. There is a negative relationship between growth and company
performance.
On the one hand, the literature shows that large companies can achieve better
returns by developing economies of scale and scope than by using the capital market
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as a source of financing (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Gupta, 1969). Thus,
larger companies have more profitable investment opportunities, greater efficiency,
more diversification, and a lower level of risk (Mainelli & Giffords, 2010). On the
other hand, other research shows that larger companies may incur inefficiencies, lead-
ing to inferior financial performance and thereby poor performance (Fama & French,
1993; Klapper & Love, 2004; O’Neill, Saunders, & McCarthy, 1989; Wu, 2006; Zajac,
1990). The most commonly used size measures are level of assets or sales
(Schmalensee, 1989). Therefore, we propose the following relationships.
Hypothesis 4a. There is a positive relationship between size and company performance.
Hypothesis 4b. There is a negative relationship between size and company performance.
Liquidity is another variable used to explain company profitability. Myers and
Rajan (1998) state that companies with greater liquidity tend to increase their bor-
rowing capacity, favouring greater financial performance and quickness in converting
assets into cash at fair market value. Good liquidity management improves operating
results and company performance, and favours access to the capital market (Moyer,
McGuigan, & Kretlow, 2001). Goddard et al. (2005) argue that liquidity shows how
quickly companies can react and adapt to changes in their environment; it can also
reduce the risk of not being able to meet companies’ short-term financial obligations.
Therefore, we propose the following relationships.
Hypothesis 5a. There is a positive relationship between liquidity and company
performance.
Hypothesis 5b. There is a negative relationship between liquidity and company
performance.
The relationship between ownership structure and performance has received con-
siderable attention by researchers all over the world (Kumar, 2003) as has the effect
of the board’s diversity on performance (De Abreu Dos Reis, Sastre-Castillo, & Roig-
Dobon, 2007). The presence of large shareholders is considered to improve control
and, therefore, to positively impact the value of the business (He & Rui, 2016).
Grossman and Hart (1983) argue that shareholders with an important share in the
company’s capital show more interest in decision making, because they can partially
internalise the benefits of their effort. On the contrary, research has identified costs
associated with certain levels of ownership concentration that can negatively affect
company performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). A high concentration of ownership
reduces managers’ freedom to make decisions and take risks, and reduces opportuni-
ties for new projects (Bushee, 1998; Pound, 1988). Meanwhile, Perrini, Rossi, and
Rovetta (2008) find that ownership concentration of a company’s five biggest share-
holders positively influences firm valuation. Khamis, Hamdan, and Elali (2015) find
that, for the first stockholder, there is a negative effect on financial performance using
ROA and Tobin’s Q but there is no effect for the second, third, fourth, and fifth
main shareholders. Maury and Pajuste (2006) find that the presence of a strong third
shareholder positively affects company value, while a second large shareholder can
negatively affect it. Konijn, Kr€aussl, and Lucas (2011) investigate the effect of the dis-
persion of the concentration of ownership on the value of the company, finding a
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negative relationship between it and financial performance. The literature review
reveals increasing empirical evidence on the effects of ownership structure on firm
performance in developed markets, but little attention has been given to emerging
markets. Therefore, we propose the following relationships.
Hypothesis 6a. There is a negative relationship between high ownership structure and
company performance.
Hypothesis 6b. There is a positive relationship between high ownership structure and
company performance.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample, variables, and data collection
The study uses a set of financial data and the ownership structure of public compa-
nies in Latin American countries. Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru are selected for this
research, because their economies have more developed markets in the region. The
data collected correspond to consolidated financial statements for each of these com-
panies. Our main source is Thomson Reuters Eikon and the Commission for the
Chilean Financial Market. One limitation of the database used in this research is that
information regarding ownership structure is available only for Chilean companies.
The period under study covers the years 2005–2015. The estimation is conducted
using STATA 14 software.
For the validity of our research hypotheses, we consider the research developed by
Espinosa, Maquieira, Vieito, and Gonzalez (2012), Paniagua, Rivelles, and Sapena
(2018), Phuong and Bich (2017), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Zeitun and Tian
(2007). This study uses panel data to estimate a regression model to identify the rela-
tionship between financial factors and financial performance. As Wooldridge (2002)
indicates, the panel data have transverse and time-series dimensions. The fixed effects
model and the random effects model stand out (Yaffee, 2005). In the fixed effects
model, the individual effect is a random variable which can be correlated with the
explanatory variables while in the random effects model, it is assumed that the indi-
vidual effect is random and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (Borenstein,
Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010).
Endogeneity is defined as the existence of correlation between the independent
variable and the error term, that is, there is a causal relationship between the inde-
pendent and the dependent variable whereby both explain each other. Endogeneity
may result from measurement errors, simultaneity, or omitted variables. In this case,
regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) is not adequate and other models must
be employed to correct it (Labra & Torrecillas, 2014). Based on previous studies,
some authors have argued that endogeneity is a typical problem in panel models that
should be corrected (Espinosa et al., 2012; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Phuong &
Bich, 2017; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). To do so, Phuong and Bich (2017) and Espinosa
et al. (2012) do not recommend the use of fixed or random effects models, since they
consider the independent variables as exogenous.
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These authors instead suggest the use of dynamic data panels by means of either
the inclusion of instrumental variables (IV) or the use of the generalised method of
moments (GMM), which yields consistent estimators in the parameters in situations
in which the OLS estimator is inconsistent. It is preferable to use the GMM in two
stages with a robust estimator, since it is more efficient and reduces the loss of infor-
mation (Arellano & Bover, 1995). This method does not lead to problems of over-
identification. To estimate the effect of the non-linear relationship between debt and
financial performance, the random effects method with robust estimator is suggested
(Phuong & Bich, 2017). We propose three models for our study. The first model
defines the relationship between financial variables and financial performance (1).
The second model recognises the existence of a possible non-linear relationship
between debt and financial performance (2). Finally, the third model recognises the
effects of ownership structure on financial performance (3).
DESi, t ¼ aþ b1SDi, t þ b2LDi, t þ b3GROi, t þ b4SIZEi, t þ b5 TANi, t þ b6TAXi, t
þ b7RISKi, t þ b8INV i, t þ b9CASH i, t þ b10PROFi, t þ b11LQi, t þ b12DIVi, t
þ ei, t
(1)
DESi, t ¼ aþ b1SDi, t þ b2SD2i, t þ b3LDi, t þ b4LD2i, t þ b5GROi, t þ b6SIZEi, t
þ b7 TANi, t þ b8TAXi, t þ b9RISKi, t þ b10INV i, t þ b11CASH i, t
þ b12PROFi, t þ b13LQi, t þ b14DIVi, t þ ei, t (2)
DESi, t ¼ aþ b1SDi, t þ b2SD2i, t þ b3LDi, t þ b4LD2i, t þ b5GROi, t þ b6SIZEi, t
þ b7 TANi, t þ b8TAXi, t þ b9RISKi, t þ b10INV i, t þ b11CASH i, t
þ b12PROFi, t þ b13LQi, t þ b14DIVi, t þ b15PRO1i, t þ b16PRO3i, t
þ b17PRO5i, t þ ei, t (3)
Measurement of variables and descriptive statistics
The sample comprises 4,715 companies studied between 2000 and 2015. Specifically,
2,272 Brazilian, 847 Chilean, 1,000 Mexican, and 596 Peruvian companies are ana-
lysed. To carry out our estimates, we present the details of each variable in Table 1.
The summarised descriptive statistics of all variables (see Table 2) show that aver-
age ROA for all companies is 10.1%, average ROE is 13.2%, and average Tobin’s Q is
1.378. For all companies, ROE shows a greater standard deviation than ROA, which
can be explained by the volatility of operational income and leverage. Peruvian com-
panies show the greatest profitability with ROA of 14.8% and ROE of 16.9%.
However, these companies have the lowest Tobin’s Q of 1.189. Mexican companies
have the highest Tobin’s Q of 1.665. With regard to leverage, the companies use
more short-term debt (SD) than long-term debt (LD). Peruvian companies show the
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highest rate of growth in sales (GRO) of 19.5% and Mexican companies show the
lowest of 10.1%. Mexican and Brazilian companies are largest in size and Chilean
companies are smallest. Meanwhile, Chilean companies have the highest proportion
of tangible assets (TAN) of 45.6% as well as investments in capital expenditure
(CAPEX) of 6.9%. In addition, Peruvian companies have the highest level of risk
(RISK) 4.5%, as well as highest profitability (PROF) 20.4% and payment of dividends
(DIV) 8.1%. Finally, Brazilian companies have greatest liquidity (LIQ) 16.3%.
There is positive correlation between SD and financial performance for all compa-
nies, but in the case of LD, there is positive correlation with Tobin’s Q. The variables
GRO, RISK, INV, CASH, PROF, and LIQ are correlated positively with performance.
The variables LD, SIZE, TAN, TAX, and DIV produce mixed results (see Table 3).
4. Regression results and discussion
To solve the endogeneity problems, we propose using instruments and lag variables
(Espinosa et al., 2012; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). As instruments for SD and LD, the
endogeneity variables we propose asset turnover ratio (Dumont & Svensson, 2014)
and total debt to capitalisation ratio (Espinosa et al., 2012; Phuong & Bich, 2017).
Based on the results of the Hausman test, the random effects model is recommended.
Table 4 summarises (1) and shows the IV results. The regressions performed are
significant at the 99% and 95% confidence levels. For ROA, 0.157 of the variation is
explained by the independent and control variables; for ROE, it is 0.007 and for
Tobin’s Q, it is 11.040. SD shows mixed results, with a negative and significant rela-
tionship with ROA of 0.0018, with ROE of 0.266, and with Tobin’s Q of 1.604. For
LD, there is a negative relationship for Brazilian, Mexican, and Peruvian companies
when the performance measures are ROA and Tobin’s Q. However, the results are
positive for Chilean companies when ROE is the performance measure. For SD, the
results are mixed for each of the performance measures. These results are
Table 1. Details of model variables.
Variables Abbreviation Detail
Return on assets ROA Earnings after tax to total assets
Return on equity ROE Earnings after tax to equity
Tobin’s Q Q Accounting value total liability plus stock capitalisation to total assets
Short-term debt SD Short-term debt to total assets
Long-term debt LD Long-term debt to total assets
Growth GRO Percentage of change in sales with respect to previous year
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets
Tangibility TAN Property, plant, and equipment to total assets
Tax TAX Tax paid on earnings before interest and tax
Operational risk RISK Standard deviation of the last 3 years of ROA
Capital expenditure INV Capital expenditure to total assets of the company
Cash CASH Earnings after tax plus annual depreciation to total assets
Profitability PROF Earnings before interest and tax to total sales
Liquidity LQ Cash and cash equivalent to total assets
Paid dividend DIV Dividend per share to share’s market price
Ownership PRO1 Ownership of largest shareholder of company i in period t.
Ownership PRO3 Ownership of three largest shareholders of company i in period t.
Ownership PRO5 Ownership of five largest shareholders of company i in period t.
Source: Own elaboration.
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inconclusive, and do not allow us to accept or reject hypothesis 1 for any perform-
ance measure.
Regarding the growth variable (GRO), we observe a positive and significant rela-
tionship for most countries, for each performance measure, which is consistent with
that proposed in the literature and indicates that companies with higher growth rates
generate more profits and improve their profitability. On average, a positive and sig-
nificant relationship is observed for each performance measure of ROA at 0.004, ROE
at 0.015, and Tobin’s Q at 0.223. However, this relationship is not observed for Chile
and Brazil when the dependent variable is ROA or for Brazil when the measure is
Tobin’s Q. Still, we can accept hypothesis 3 for any performance measure.
In terms of size (SIZE), a positive and significant relationship is observed at the
99% and 95% confidence levels for each performance measure of ROA at 0.001, ROE
at 0.003, and Tobin’s Q at 0.437. Larger companies are expected to face lower bank-
ruptcy costs and, therefore, have higher profitability; in our analysis, the effect of size
is highlighted by Tobin’s Q for Peruvian companies of 0.608. These results allow us
to support hypothesis 4 for all performance measures.
Meanwhile, liquidity (LIQ) does not show a significant or positive relationship for
each of the performance measures. Specifically, Brazil’s relationship is 0.065 and
0.178 at the 99% and 90% confidence level when the performance measure is ROA
and ROE, respectively. For Mexico liquidity show a similar relationship of 0.248
when the performance measure is ROE. These results do not support hypothesis 5.
Table 5 shows the estimates for (1) through the GMM method. The results
obtained for LD are similar to those obtained with the IVs for ROA and ROE at a
confidence level of 99% and 95%, respectively. However, it is not significant when
considering Tobin’s Q of 0.240. On the contrary, SD is significant and negative when
considering ROA as a performance measure. These results are inconclusive, and do
not allow us to accept or reject hypothesis 1 for any performance measure.
With respect to growth, a result similar to the use of instruments is observed for
each of the variables at the 95% confidence level with ROA of 0.003, ROE of 0.013,
and Tobin’s Q of 0.287. In terms of size, there is a positive and significant relation-
ship for most countries with ROA of 0.006, ROE of 0.010, and Tobin’s Q of 0.026.
Thus, we support hypotheses 3 and 4. Meanwhile, liquidity (LIQ) shows a significant
and negative relationship only for Peru (0.065) at the 99% confidence level when the
performance measure is ROE. This result does not support hypothesis 5.
This study estimates (2), and thus, tests hypothesis 2 on the non-linear effects for
SD and LD. For SD, there is a negative and significant relationship when ROA is the
performance measure of -0.069 at the 90% confidence level. At the country level,
there is a similar effect for Chile and Peru when we use Tobin’s Q of 7.890 and
3.053, respectively. However, there is a positive and significant effect for Chile
when we use ROA and ROE as performance measures. When we analyse the effects
of long-term debt, there is a negative and significant effect for Mexico of 2.489.
However, there is a positive relationship for Brazil of 0.129, for Mexico of 0.085, and
for Peru of 0.144 when we use ROA as well as for Mexico of 0.337 and for Peru of
3.497 when the performance measure is ROE and Tobin’s Q. These results do not
support hypothesis 2 for any performance measure (see Table 6).
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Table 7 summarises (3) and shows the results for each of the measures of concen-
tration of ownership of Chilean companies. There are mixed results. The effects of
ownership concentration of the first main shareholder shows a negative relationship
of 0.008 and 0.046 when we use ROA and ROE, respectively. However, a there is
a positive and significant effect of 0.622 when Tobin’s Q is used. With respect to the
second largest shareholder, there is a negative but not significant effect of 0.018 and
0.984 when using ROA and Tobin’s Q, respectively. However, the ratio is positive
at 0.056 when the performance measure is ROE. Finally, the fifth largest shareholder
has a positive but not significant effect of 0.034, 0.006, and 0.651 when using ROA,
ROE, and Tobin’s Q, respectively.
The results in this study in relation to the concentration of ownership and finan-
cial performance are inconclusive when we use Tobin’s Q, which is in accordance
with Evans and Dion (2012), Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker (1994), and Maquieira,
Espinosa, and Vieito (2011), who showed a positive relationship between greater con-
centration and financial performance. The other results are in accordance with
Paniagua et al. (2018), who cannot establish causality between the ownership struc-
ture and the company’s financial performance. Finally, these results do not support
hypothesis 2 for any performance measure.
5. Conclusions
The objective of this study was to estimate the effects of the variables that affect the
profitability of Brazilian, Chilean, Mexican, and Peruvian companies. Our results
Table 7. Regression results of ownership and financial performance with estimations on random
effects and robust estimators.
Variables ROA Standard deviation ROE Standard deviation Q Standard deviation
SD 0,089 0,073 0,206 0,160 7,391 2,075
SD2 0,118 0,138 0,084 0,318 12,469 3,758
LD 0,095 0,049 0,090 0,082 0,238 0,878
LD2 0,212 0,088 0,169 0,154 0,161 1,380
GRO 0,009 0,004 0,010 0,007 0,226 0,146
SIZE 0,000 0,001 0,003 0,003 0,020 0,037
TAN 0,001 0,006 0,003 0,029 0,024 0,285
TAX 0,006 0,002 0,006 0,002 0,119 0,017
RISK 0,016 0,071 0,099 0,159 1,013 2,887
INV 0,047 0,043 0,048 0,059 1,615 0,781
CASH 0,882 0,053 1,531 0,093 4,913 1,225
PROF 0,005 0,018 0,075 0,048 1,305 0,639
LQ 0,025 0,017 0,014 0,039 0,444 0,564
DIV 0,088 0,056 0,193 0,088 0,5890 0,328
PROP1 0,008 0,014 0,046 0,037 0,622 0,320
PROP3 0,018 0,031 0,056 0,082 0,984 0,891
PROP5 0,034 0,025 0,006 0,056 0,651 0,694
Constant 0,006 0,021 0,125 0,058 0,556 0,517
Observations 185 185 185
Wald Chi2 1341,99 3181,55 227,68
Prob> Chi2 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.p< 0.1;p< 0.05;p< 0.01.
Source: Own computation using Stata 14 software.
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provide relevant and updated information on the variables that affect performance.
The results did not allow us to observe the effect of leverage on financial perform-
ance, as there were mixed results between SD and LD.
This study could not establish the existence of a non-linear relationship between
leverage and firm performance for all performance measures, although a non-linear
relationship for SD and LD was observed when considering ROA and Tobin’s Q.
This study found a positive relationship between company performance whit size
and growth as proposed performance measures. Finally, this study observed no rela-
tionship between firm performance and ownership structure, except for first largest
shareholder with Tobin’s Q.
Some of the major limitations to this work identified are perhaps related to its
lack of consideration strategic variables that enable establishing the effects of business
diversification, entrepreneurship management, and innovation as key variables of
competitive advantage. As future research, we propose identification of strategic vari-
ables that contribute to company performance. In addition, this study could be
extended to other countries in South America.
The practical contribution of this study is as follows. We conclude that financial
performance is partially explained by and must be studied alongside such variables as
the business model, industry cycle, and competitive and corporate strategy in order
to strengthen analysis and quality of company performance.
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